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Abstract-Specificity is a fundamental concept which enters into all approaches to the 
description of system organization and behavior. However, it is a qualitative concept 
rather than a quantitative one, and as such its proper mathematical representation raises 
special problems. We argue herein that the qualitative notion of specificity may be 
characterized more precisely as the departure of system trajectories from orgodicity. 
We show that such a departure from ergodicity precludes arbitrary system interactions, 
and hence automatically generates specificity. From this point of view, specificity can 
be understood without the need to posit any special “recognition” mechanisms. A 
number of further implications of this picture are briefly discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The modelling relation is perhaps the most fundamental relation in all of natural science. 
It is second only to language as a sinr qlra ~OII for human thought. For our purposes, a 
modelling relation between a natural system S and a formal system M involves the 
establishment of a commutative diagram of the kind sketched in Figure 1. In such a 
diagram, specific properties of the natural system S are encoded or imaged in correspond- 
ing properties of a mathematical or formal system M. The inferential structure in M is 
the formal counterpart of behaviors of S, for which the encoding sets initial conditions, 
in the form of “axioms” to which the inferential rules of M may be applied. The infer- 
ences established in M on this basis become, through a process of decoding, predictions 
about the corresponding behaviours of S, which may then be compared with observation. 
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It is easiest to establish such modelling relations between natural systems S and formal 
systems M when the behaviors or system properties of S can be expressed quantitatively. 
In that case, we are on familiar and well-explored ground. However, most of the deepest 
problems of science revolve around questions for which quantitative characterization is 
difficult or even perhaps impossible. For instance, most of the qualities which distinguish 
organisms from inanimate matter seem to be of this type. As we have stressed elsewhere 
[ll such qualities are at least as “real” as those which can be easily reduced to quanti- 
tative measurement, and indeed are perceived by us in exactly the same way. On the 
other hand, the establishment of modelling relations adequate to capture qualitative char- 
acters, and to relate them to the more familiar quantitative aspects, which we can both 
measure and model more readily, raises special and very deep problems. Traditionally 
we are forced in these circumstances to fall back on the notion of mrtaphov, which is a 
somewhat weaker concept than that of model. In biology, two very interesting attempts 
to deal rigorously with qualitative ideas are available: the relational biology of Rashevsky 
[31 and the author [41, and the Catastrophe Theory of Thorn [51. 
In this paper, we shall consider one particular qualitative feature of organic behavior, 
which is embodied in the concept of specificiry. This feature arises already at the most 
microscopic levels of organic behavior; it is manifested at every step of primary genetic 
mechanisms; it appears in the interaction of an enzyme with its substrates, a receptor 
with its ligands, or an antibody with its corresponding atigens. At higher physiological, 
neural and behavioral levels, specificity provided the conceptual cement which makes 
coherent behavior possible. Yet the problem of characterizing the concept of specificity 
per se remains completely open. It is to this problem that the subsequent considerations 
are addressed. The formal characterization of specificity is important not only in its own 
right, but because of the light it may throw on how other qualities may be approached in 
a rigorous fashion. As we shall see, it is the modelling relation itself, or rather the failure 
of such a relation, which provides the essential tool for this purpose. 
2. ERGODICITY: PARTS AS MODELS OF WHOLES 
Let (E, a, p) be a measure space; i.e., E is a set, R is a Boolean algebra of measurable 
subsets of E, and p is a measure. For definiteness, we may take E as an interval on the 
real line, or as some manifold in a higher-dimensional Euclidean space, with 0 the algebra 
of Bore1 sets and I_L the ordinary Lebesgue measure. 
If .f: E -+ R is any integrable real-valued function on E, then J‘ induces a real-valued 
mapping u:R + R by writing 
for every FeR. Alternatively, if we denote the restriction of j” to F by j’lF, we can write 
What we wish to do now is consider how well such a subset F C E “approximates” to 
the larger set which contains it, as measured by u. As we shall see, this reduces to the 
problem of determining how well .f/ F approximates to f on E. Using (2), this latter degree 
of approximation can be measured by comparing the values u(E) and u(F). Obviously, 
i,t follows from the relation 
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that if the quantity 1 u(E) - u(F)1 is small, then fand f/F can be different only on a set 
of small measure. 
It is further obvious that if F,, F2, C E are two measurable subsets which approximate 
to E in the above sense, then F1 and F, approximate to each other; i.e., (u(F,) - 
u( F2)l is small. More precisely, we have 
IU(Fl) - u(FJl 5 IU(Fl) - u(E)1 + /u(E) - u(Fdl, 
from which our claim immediately follows. 
It should also be noted that this idea of approximation of E by F depends entirely 
upon the choice of the function f. That is, if g: E + R is some other intergrable function, 
and if we define p:LR ---, R by writing p(F) = Jgdp, there is no reason to expect that 
Ip(E) - P(F)] . 1s small even though Iv(E) - u(F)/ is. 
Let us now generalize these remarks slightly. Instead of a single function f, let US 
consider a family {(fi, . . . . f,,} of integrable functions on E. With respect to such a family, 
we can say that a subset F C E approximates to E if and only if the differences Iui(E) 
- q(F)1 are small for each index i = 1, . . . . n, [where the set functions ui are defined 
analogous to (l)]. In this case, we may say that the replacement of E by F is essentially 
invisible to the functions ui in our family. 
Next, we shall suppose that the values Vi(E) are not independent, but satisfy some 
relation of the form 
@[Vi(E), . ..f U,(E)] = 0. (3) 
For reasons soon to become apparent, we shall call such a relation an equation of state 
for E. If F C E approximates to E in the above sense, then it is clear that, modulo a 
small error term, this same equation of state will hold for F as well; i.e., 
@,[u,(F), . .. . %ml = 0 
is at least approximately true. We may generally say then, that if F approximates to E 
in the above sense, then E and F are similur; they satisfy the same equation of state. 
This is indeed the general definition of similarity [I]; the concept of similarity is of course 
a special case of a modelling relation. Thus we have expressed the original notion of 
approximation to a set E by a subset F in terms of the satisfaction of a common equation 
of state (3) by E and F, and this is an explicit modelling relation between them. We note 
explicitly that if F, and F, are both similar to E, then they are again similar to each 
other. 
We are going to take the point of view that the original measure space (E,R,p) con- 
stitutes a system; that the functions ui defined as in (1) represent observubles of that 
system; and that an equation of state like (3) characterizes or expresses some feature of 
the system. Passing to a subset F C E will be regarded as imposing some construints on 
the original system. In these terms, then, the extent to which F approximates to E will 
measure the effect of the constraints upon the feature defined by (3); i.e., it will measure 
the extent to which the constrained system behaves like the original one. 
The above circle of ideas has arisen more or less independently in a variety of important 
contexts in mathematics and the physical sciences. Let us cite a few examples before 
proceeding further. 
1. In the very definition of measure, and of the corresponding concept of definite 
integral, the aim is to construct a sequence Fi of approximations to E. For instance, in 
the simplest case, the partitions of intervals which enter into the definition of approxi- 
mating sums to the Riemann integral constitutes such a sequence. In this case, the ap- 
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proximations are so chosen as to be uniform over the entire class of functions f which 
are Riemann-intergrable. The same remarks apply to Lebesgue measure as well. 
2. In algebraic topology, the approximation to a manifold by appropriate simplicial 
complexes is again of the above type. Here the goodness of the approximation is mea- 
sured in terms of appropriate topological invariants. There is indeed a close relation 
between the approximation of a manifold by simplicial complexes, and the approximation 
of a domain of integration by appropriate partitions. 
3. In statistical mechanics, we take as point of departure a particular manifold in phase 
space which constitutes an energy surface. For conservative mechanical systems, it is 
well known that the flow induced by the equations of motion on such an energy surface 
is measure-preserving (Liouville’s Theorem). The basic feature which makes statistical 
mechanics possible at all is the idea that a generic trajectory on such an energy surface 
approximates to the entire surface; or even more strongly, that a sufficiently extended 
initial segment, and even a discrete approximation thereto, approximate the entire sur- 
face. This feature is simply the (quasi)-ergodic hypothesis, which is expressed by the 
assertion that time averages (over individual trajectories, or approximations thereto) 
equal phase uvemges (over the entire energy surface). 
In general then, the notion of approximation we have introduced is simply a formal 
expression of the concept of ergodicity, transplanted to an appropriately general setting. 
In turn, we can see that ergodicity in general is a way of expressing the extent to which 
a part behaves like, or approximates, a whole. Stated otherwise, the import of ergodicity 
is that it establishes a modelling relation between a whole and certain of its parts. Fur- 
thermore, if we regard the passage from whole to part as arising from the imposition of 
constraints, then ergodicity expresses the extent to which the constraints are invisible 
when the whole is replaced by the part, at least with respect to certain definite behaviors. 
3. ERGODICITY AND SPECIFICITY 
Let us suppose that fi, . . . , flL is a family of real-valued mappings from a set E into real 
numbers. Then we may represent the elements of E by n-tuples of real numbers 111, by 
writing 
x--, rflb), . . ..f?dx)l 
for every x in E. In this way, we embed E as a subset of R”, real n-dimensional Euclidean 





where E” is the n-fold Cartesian product of E with itself, and 6: E * E” is the diagonal 
map x -+ (x, x, . . . , x). 
Let us next suppose that a map +: R” + R is given. Then +-l(O) defines a subset of 
R” (possibly empty). We shall say that the elements of this subset satisfy the constraint 
imposed by $. Indeed, the elements of this subset are precisely the n-tuples (v,, . . . . v,) 
which satisfy the relation 
ljJ(rl ) .) r7,) = 0. 
It will be noticed that such a constraint is the exact analog of what we earlier called an 
equation of state. 
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Using the diagram (4), we can refer this notion of constraint back to the set E. Spe- 
cifically, we shall say that an element x E E satisfies the constraint if 
(fix . . . .&)8(x) E +-l(O). (5) 
Thus, a constraint defines a subset G C_ E (possibly empty); the set of all elements of E 
which satisfy the relation (5). 
If now E is the underlying set of a measure space (E, a, p), and if each mapping .fi 
is intergrable, then for each i = 1, . . . . II we can define a corresponding mapping Vi: R + 




u1.x . . . xun 
’ R” . (6) 
We can now regard an equation of state as defined by a mapping 
@: R” -+ R, 
which is satisfied by all sets F E R such that 
(u,x . . . xu,)G(F) E W’(O) . (7) 
We agreed to identify the concept of a jeature with the holding of an equation of state; 
I.e., that any set F satisfying (7) manifest the corresponding feature. 
We shall of course, be particularly interested in those features which are manifested 
by the whole set E; i.e., features defined by equations of state such that 
(upx . . . XII,) 6 (E) E Q-‘(O) (8) 
is true. It is clear that those subsets F C E which approximate to E, in the sense defined 
in the preceding section, are precisely those for which (8) continues to hold when E is 
replaced by F. 
We shall now show that the imposition oj’rr construint [i.e., a relation of the form (5)] 
on E will generally cause a feuture of E dejined by (7) to be lost. For in order for the 
feature (7) to be retained in the presence of the constraint, it is necessary and sufficient 
that the subset G C E, consisting of all elements of E which satisfy the constraint, also 
satisfy (8). That is, this subset G must already approximate to E. But this will not in 
general be the case for arbitrary constraints $ and arbitrary equations of state a. Thus, 
constraints imposed on E eliminute features dejined on R. 
Let us now proceed to relate the notion of feature to the concept of specificity. We 
shall do this by relating the capacity for interactions between systems to the manifestation 
of particular features. That is, we shall argue that, in general, the capacity of any system 
to interact is determined precisely by the kinds of equations of state which it satisfies. 
From this, we can conclude that the more features are manifested by a particular system, 
the more interactions it will be competent to participate in. 
To say that two systems interact specifically means precisely that there is a restriction 
imposed on the kinds of interactions which can occur between them. For instance, an 
enzyme does not interact with arbitrary compounds, but only with a highly circumscribed 
set of substrates. The point of view usually taken with respect to such specific interactions 
(albeit tacitly) is that specificity arises from a positive process of “recognition.” How- 
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ever, we are developing what will seem at first sight to be quite a different viewpoint, 
namely: specificity arises from a negative process; the absence or removal of those fea- 
tures necessary to allow arbitrary interactions to occur. 
From this viewpoint, specificity is created us CI necessury consequence of the elirni- 
nrrtion offeutuws. In turn, features are eliminated by the imposition of constraints on 
the underlying set E, such that the subsets G determined by these constraints cease to 
be ergodic in E; i.e., do not approximate to E with respect to the equations of state 
which determine the features. The less ergodic the subset G, the fewer interactions the 
constrained system will be capable of, hence the greater the specificity of these interac- 
tions must be. In simple terms, ergodicity mandates nonspecificity; departure from er- 
godicity necessarily causes specificity to emerge. 
4. DISCUSSION 
The discussion of the previous sections may be given the following interpretation. 
1. The set E can be taken as a set of microstates for some physical system. 
2. The mappings f;: E + R constitute a set of observables for the system at the 
microlevel. 
3. The algebra R constitutes a set of macrostates for the same physical system. 
4. The mappings ui: fi + R constitute a set of observables .for the system at the 
macrolevel. 
5. The equations of state, which relate observables at the macrolevel, define the fea- 
tures of the system at that level. 
We have taken the point of view that the presence of particular features is necessary in 
order for corresponding interactions to occur. Thus, the absence of a feature prohibits 
interactions, and thereby generates specificity. 
This picture is in accord with the character of the examples of specificity which mo- 
tivated our approach. For instance, the rate laws governing particular chemical interac- 
tions are statistical at root; their expression involves forming averages (i.e., integrating) 
over appropriate ensembles (subsets) of phase space. Indeed, it is a basic postulate of 
statistical mechanics that, at the macrolevel, only such averages possess physical mean- 
ing. 
In formally relating macroscopic to microscopic properties, a basic role is assigned to 
those subsets of E which constitute trajectories in the microscopic sense. The entire 
formalism of statistical mechanics depends upon the assertion that almost all such tra- 
jectories approximate to the full energy surface in hhich such trajectories lie. Indeed, 
this situation was the origin of the concept of ergodicity. Intuitively, an ergodic trajectory 
is one which samples the energy surface in a uniform and unbiased way. 
Such an unbiased sampling produces a macrosystem with a maximal number of fea- 
tures; i.e., satisfying a maximal number of equations of state. As we move further away 
from ergodicity (as we sample an energy surface in a more and more biased way with 
respect to the measure p) these macroscopic features are progressively lost. If, as we 
have posited, such features represent vehicles for interaction, this loss of ergodicity is 
accompanied by a corresponding increase in specificity. This is accomplished without 
any need to posit any special mechanisms for “recognition.” 
Thus, specificity is a comparative concept, as are the related notions of order and 
organization. The advantage of our approach is that the qualitative notion of specificity 
can be replaced by a quantitative notion; namely, the departure of some set of macrostates 
from ergodicity. In effect, we measure specificity by taking the most nonspecific situation 
as a standard, and referring every other system to this standard. In this respect, ergodicity 
is much like another familiar measure of organization; namely, entropy. Here too, we 
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choose a state of maximal entropy as a standard, and measure the degree of organization 
or order in a system by referring it to this standard. There is in fact a close relation 
between the departure of a system from ergodicity and the magnitude of its entropy, in 
any system for which both of these concepts are defined. However, ergodicity (in the 
sense of the approximation of a part to a whole) is a universally definable concept, 
whereas entropy can only be defined in much more circumscribed situations. 
The availability of a precise quantitative characterization of specificity is of great im- 
portance in many practical situations. For instance, whenever we employ a testing or 
assay procedure for characterizing a physical system, we are tacitly relying on the spec- 
ificity of this procedure. That is, we are relying on the interactions which characterize 
our test to identify those particular features in which we are interested; i.e., to serve as 
feature detectors. The absolute identification of the results of such a test with the pres- 
ence (or absence) of the corresponding features is only justified if we can assert absolute 
specificity for the interactions in question; only in such a case is it possible to assert that 
“false positives” and “false negatives” cannot occur. In practice, there is no way to 
obtain such an assurance; indeed, we always ascertain such specificity in a relutive sense, 
by utilizing one set of feature detectors to evaluate the specificity of another set. How- 
ever, an approach to specificity of the kind suggested above, which depends on a well- 
defined notion of ergodicity, with respect to which we can characterize specificity in an 
absolute and not a relative or comparative sense, obviates many of the difficulties inherent 
in a purely comparative approach. 
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